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 INTRODUCTION 
 In recent years considerable interest has been expressed by 
psychologists regarding the influence of pragmatic factors on human 
reasoning. We reports here an experiment on pragmatic influences upon 
conditional reasoning, using the experimental paradigm par excellence in 
conditional inference: Wason’s selection task (Wason, 1966, 1968). 
 In the standard form task, participants are shown four cards 
displaying two letters (say A, D) and two numbers (say 3, 7) and a 
conditional rule. “If there is an A on one side then there is a 3 on the other 
side”. They are told that each card has a letter on one side and a number on 
the other side. The task consists of selecting those cards they would need to 
turn over in order to discover whether the rule is true or false. This task is 
often referred to as the abstract selection task, due to arbitrary problem 
content. It is also now recognised to be an indicative selection task, since 
the conditional makes an assertion about truth relations in the world and the 
task is to discover whether or not the rule is in fact true. 
_________________ 
* This work was presented at  the European Conference on Cognitive Science. Siena, 
Italy, October 1999.  
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 The poor logical performance observed on this version of the task 
(less than 10% of participants typically select the correct cards: A and 7 or, 
in general, p and not-q) has been associated with the abstract nature of the 
rule with facilitation claimed for thematic versions of the task in a number 
of papers (Wason and Shapiro, 1971; Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi & Sonino 
Legrenzi, 1972; see Evans, Newstead & Byrne, 1993, chapter 4 for a 
detailed review). However Manktelow & Evans (1979) showed that 
thematic content may not facilitate performance if it lacks pragmatic cues 
which help people to retrieve relevant prior knowledge. 
 One of the studies in which the highest levels of correct performance 
was registered was Griggs and Cox’s (1982), with the “drinking age rule”. 
Here people are asked to imagine they are police officers checking whether 
the following rule is being obeyed with regard to people drinking in a bar: 
“If a person is drinking a beer then that person must be over 19 years of 
age”. Most people correctly investigate a person drinking beer (p) and one 
under 19 years of age (not-q). Note that this is framed as a deontic task 
(discovering whether a rule is being obeyed) and it has a short preceding 
scenario setting the police officer perspective. Pollard & Evans (1987) 
manipulated both the content of the rule and the presence or absence of a 
scenario. When the scenario was eliminated in the drinking age task, the 
facilitation effect disappeared. However, adding a scenario to an abstract 
selection task did not facilitate. The authors observed that both factors, 
content and scenario were the required for the correct performance. A 
number of studies have also looked at the role of deontic/indicative framing 
in the selection task (see Evans et al., 1993, pp. 104-107). The findings are 
similar to those of the scenario manipulation. That is, use of an indicative 
frame  can  weaken  or  eliminate  the  facilitation  observed  with  typical    
 
 2
The role of scenario, deontic conditionals and problem content in Wason´s selection task 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
thematic versions such as the drinking age rule, but deontic framing in 
itself does not lead to facilitation observed with typical thematic versions 
such as the drinking age rule, but deontic framing in itself does not lead to 
facilitation of abstract versions of the problem. 
 In a previous study done by Valiña, Seoane, Ferraces and Martín 
(1998a), participants were shown three selection tasks (one abstract and 
two thematic versions). The availability of the scenario in which the tasks 
were included (available vs. non-available) and the instructions (true/false 
vs. violation) were also manipulated. Two new results were found. On one 
hand, against what it was predicted, there was no significant interaction 
between content and scenario. On the other hand, there was a significant 
interaction between content and instructions. Performance was better in 
both the abstract version and one of the thematic versions, with violation 
instructions. In contrast with permission rule performance was better with 
verification instructions. Additionally, the rules which included the modal 
verb “must”, gave higher logical indices. These results seem to suggest the 
effect of the deontic nature of the rule and may be explained within the 
context of the theory of pragmatic reasoning schemas (Cheng & Holyoak, 
1985, 1989). More precisely, the abstract-deontic and the thematic-
obligation versions could be assimilated to the  obligation schema (O1 rule: 
“If the precondition is satisfied, then the action must be taken”) and the 
thematic-permission task to the permission-schema (P3 rule: “If the 
precondition is satisfied, then the action may be taken”; see Holyoak & 
Cheng, 1995, p. 70). However, in this experiment the authors also obtained 
results not easily explained by the theory of pragmatic reasoning schemas. 
Moreover, the deontic variable had not been manipulated in this experiment 
(see also Valiña, Seoane, Ferraces & Martín, 1999). 
 3
European Conference on Cognitive Science 
______________________________________________________________________ 
  
 On the other hand, in the study of Pollard & Evans (1987), the use of 
deontic and indicative framing was confounded with the use of thematic 
and abstract materials as is frequently the case in the literature. Thus we 
feel it would be useful to provide further investigation of the scenario effect 
in which this variable is also investigated. 
 In the experiment described here, all rules are thematic but one is 
neutral in nature, so that prior knowledge is not likely to help performance. 
We also use two other contents involving permission and obligation 
relationships which have been shown to facilitate performance in a number 
of studies in the literature when presented with scenarios and deontic 
framing. All participants attempted problems in all three contents. 
However, in this experiment half were given indicative and half deontic 
framing. Each of these groups was further divided according to whether or 
not a scenario was present. 
 
 METHOD 
 Participants 
 152 (131 females and 21 males) undergraduate psychology students 
from the University of Santiago de Compostela (Spain), took part in this 
study. 
 Design  
 Each participant was given three selection tasks corresponding to 
three different contents of the rule. We called them neutral, permission and 
obligation. In addition to the thematic content, two other factors were 
manipulated between groups: (a) presence or absence of a scenario; (b) 
presence  or  absence  of  deontic  framing.  In  deontic  versions  the  word  
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“must”  was  added  in  the  conditional  and  participants  were instructed 
to discover whether or not the rule had been obeyed. With indicative 
framing the word “must” was omitted and participants were asked to 
discover whether the rule was true or false. 
 
 Materials 
 The problems were presented in booklets. Each booklet contained 
three thematic selection tasks. We elaborated two parallel versions. Each 
participant only saw one of those versions and they received the following 
information for the three experimental tasks: “Each of the four cards shown 
below has something written on each one of their two sides. Of course, as 
the cards are lying flat, you can only see one side of each card”. 
Participants had to reason according to the following rules and cards shown 
for each content of the rule: 
 (a) Neutral: “If a card has cat written on one side, then it must 
have/has rose written on the other side”. The four cards shown were: 
“CAT”, “LION”, “ROSE”, “CARNATION”. 
 (b) Permission: “If a card has beer written on one side, then it must 
have/has over 18 years of age written on the other side”. The four  cards 
shown were: “BEER”, “COKE”, “22 YEARS OF AGE”, “16 YEARS 
OF AGE”. 
 (c) Obligation: “If a card has bricklayer written on one side, then it 
must have/has hard hat written on the other side”. The four cards shown 
were: “BRICKLAYER”, “CHEF”, “HARD HAT”, “CAP”. 
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 For half of the subjects the rules for each of the three experimental 
tasks included the modal verb must  (Deontic frame condition). The other 
half received identical rules except that they did not contain the modal verb 
must (Indicative frame condition). In the “Scenario conditions”, the same 
rules and cards were presented, but in these conditions rules and cards were 
included in a scenario.  
 
 Procedure 
 Each participant was randomly allocated to each of the four 
experimental groups (Scenario-Deontic frame, Scenario-Indicative frame, 
No Scenario-Deontic frame, No Scenario-Indicative frame). Participants 
were tested in small groups in the same laboratory. They completed the 
tasks individually. Each received one booklet which contained three 
experimental tasks presented in random order. Participants performed the 
experimental tasks without time limit.  
 
 RESULTS  
 Table 1 shows the percentage of frequencies of selection of each card 
on each thematic rule and Figure 1 presents the frequencies of correct 
selection broken down by the three experimental variables. 
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Table 1. Percent  selections  for  each  content  of  the  rule  in  each  
     experimental condition (N = 38 in each experimental condition) 
 
 Neutral Permission Obligation 
 
TA     FA     TC     FC     TA     FA     TC      FC   TA     FA      TC      FC   
Deontic &  
Scenario 
 
 
89      42       39       58 
   
     89         8        0       60 
    
    87       29        3       39   
Indicative &  
Scenario 
 
 
76      39       11       24 
 
     74       13        5       50 
   
    84       37        8       37 
Deontic & 
 No Scenario 
 
 
29        0       84       66 
 
     87       56      18       34 
   
    87       66      16       34 
Indicative &  
No Scenario 
 
82      56       13       24 
 
     84       37      13       47 
  
    89       50      13       29 
Note: 
TA = True-Antecedent (p), FA = False-Antecedent (not-p), 
TC = True-Consequent (q), FC = False-Consequent (not-q). 
TA and FC (p and not-q) is the logically correct choice on the three rules 
 
  
 As Figure 1 shows, the highest percentage of correct selections was 
obtained with rules expressing a permission for all experimental conditions. 
In contrast, the lowest frequency of correct responses was obtained with 
neutral rules. The selection of correct answers is substantially higher when 
the scenario is present, specially with permission and obligation rules. 
Scenario effects appear most marked when deontic framing is used. 
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Figure 1. Correct selection (%) on each content of the rule
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 In order to provide statistical assessment of these trends, a Logical 
Index was computed in the manner described by Pollard & Evans (1987). 
This index is computed for each attempted solution to each problem by 
adding a score of one for each correct p or not-q selection made and 
subtracting one for each incorrect not-p or q selection made. The logic 
index can thus range from – 2 to + 2. A 3 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was performed 
on the index with one within group factor: content, on three levels, and two 
between group factors: scenario and framing with two levels each. 
 The results show a significant main effect of the problem content 
(F(2, 147)= 16.60; p < .0001). Post hoc analyses revealed significant 
differences between neutral content (M= .50) and permission content (M= 
.97), p < .0001. There was also a significant difference between  permission  
and  obligation  rules  (M= .28, p < .027). Overall higher logical indices 
were obtained with permission content. The lowest logical indices were 
registered with neutral rules.  
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 A significant main effect of Scenario was also obtained     
(F(1,148)= 19.24; p < .0001). For all three types of content, the logical 
indices were higher in the Scenario condition (M= .986), than in the No-
Scenario condition (M= .464). 
 Finally a significant interaction between Scenario and Frame was 
registered: F(1,148)= 7.64; p < .006). As shown in Figure 2, performance 
was considerably higher with scenarios present rather than absent when 
deontic framing was used, but there was little effect of scenario with 
indicative framing. Nevertheless, there was no significant interaction 
between scenario and content. 
 
 
Figure 2. Interactive effects between scenario and frame in the logical 
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 DISCUSSION  
 The results of this study offer empirical evidence about the 
importance of semantic and pragmatic factors in performance with 
Wason’s selection task. The main effect of the content is broadly consistent 
with earlier findings in the literature. Although all problems are thematic, 
the neutral problem provides no helpful pragmatic cues to the correct 
solution and logical performance with this content is generally low. By 
contrast, the problems which cue a permission or obligation context 
produce much higher rates of successful solution. Performance was, 
however, significantly better with the permission than with the obligation 
rule. 
 The main results of interest obtained in this study refers to the 
importance of the context on performance as manipulated by the presence 
or absence of scenarios. The presence of a scenario which contextualised 
the task appears to facilitate the elaboration of a mental framework for 
reasoning and facilitates logical performance. However, as proposed by 
Pollard & Evans (1987) and more recently Evans (1995), the mere presence 
of a scenario does not always facilitate correct performance. Recall that 
Pollard &Evans found a scenario effect  restricted  to  thematic materials, 
but  -in contrast with the current experiment- failed to separate the use of 
permission content and deontic framing. 
 Having separated the two variables in this study, we find  -consistent 
with the results found by Valiña et al. (1998a)- that it is not the problem 
content as such with which scenario interacts, but the presence or absence 
of deontic framing. There is a large facilitatory effect of using a scenarios, 
but only when problems are framed in a deontic manner (Figure 2). The 
dual process theory (Evans & Over, 1996) proposes an explanation of this  
 10
The role of scenario, deontic conditionals and problem content in Wason´s selection task 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
finding. Evans & Over (1996, chapter 4) provide detailed discussion of the 
differences between deontic and indicative selection task. The deontic task 
requires decisions about appropriate actions and can thus be correctly cued 
by the implicit, pragmatic reasoning system. However, such cueing 
requires the retrieval of relevant knowledge from memory which is evoked 
by use of a scenario. Thus scenario and deontic framing combine to assist 
the reasoner. The indicative task, by contrast, requires hypothetical 
reasoning about truth and falsity. This depends upon use of our much less 
reliable explicit reasoning system. The absence of a scenario effect on the 
indicative selection task is very interesting in this context. Hence even 
when pragmatic cues to prior knowledge are provided by a scenario, they 
do not assist people in the task of deciding whether some indicative 
conditional may be true or false. 
 Although further research is needed on this question, this 
interpretation is supported by some recent results obtained by Stanovich & 
West (1998), in an investigation of individual differences in reasoning. 
These authors also recorded an improved performance in different thematic 
and deontic versions, compared to abstract and indicative versions. 
However, they found that the small number of participants who performed 
correctly the indicative versions of the tasks had a significantly high “g” 
factor level of general intelligence than those who failed. By contrast, there 
was no relationship between intelligence and success on deontic versions of 
the task. This finding -as Stanovich & West note- is best interpreted within 
the dual process framework. Indicative selection tasks require use of the 
explicit thinking system for hypothetical reasoning and this system is 
related to general intelligence. On the other hand performance on deontic  
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selection task depends only upon the use of the implicit system which is 
independent of g. 
 If this interpretation is correct, then different performance would be 
expected by participants in different versions of the task, according to their 
particular individual abilities. One subject which we consider requires 
further investigation is the study of individual differences in reasoning 
(Dominowski & Dallop, 1991;Valiña, Seoane, Ferraces & Martín, 1995, 
1998b). We believe that the study of the differential analyses of reasoning 
is a course which will allow us to advance in the knowledge of the 
mechanisms which permit the process of human reasoning to be explained.  
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